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Abstract 
The information security experts are finding it challenging to timely response the emerging 
threats. The rapid changing of security landscape and dependency on the agile software and 
system development projects make it challenging to address these threats in a real time. This 
could create potential risks to the overall business continuity. Furthermore, critical human 
factors, cost and investment in the information security field will add more anxiety in dealing 
with risks in an agile environment. There is a need for a unified approach to address the 
principles of information security, human factors and security investment in an agile 
environment. This paper provides a solution for constructing an effective information security 
system by taking into consideration an adequate risk assessment and controls, considering 
critical human factors and security investment within agile changes of security landscape. A 
list of concepts is considered for the purpose of an effective information security system. The 
paper also includes a short review of existing knowledge on the topics of agile development 
and information security.  
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1. Introduction 
Adequate and effective balance between organizational objectives and information 
security goals has always been a divisive issue in the field of information security 
and the gap between these two supported by many professionals (Sennewald and 
Baillie 2015). In many instances, particularly in financial institutions, information 
security professionals disagree with the rest of the organization on number of issues 
related to security, including critical human factors and security investment (Alavi et 
al. 2015). Such disagreement at organizational level comes at the time that business 
environment has more agility. This discrepancy creates impacts on information 
security system to achieve its objectives (McHugh et al. 2012). The concept of agile 
security straight advanced from agile software development applications. The agile 
projects have been replacing people with the process and scrapping plans for the 
purpose of just a response to changes (Hecker and Kolb 2015). This enables 
organizations to save in expenditures, including information security development 
process. Therefore, people and cost factors adversely impacted information security 
objectives. Whilst traditional approach uses resources such as time, budget and 
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people to enhance quality and fulfil goals, agile approach sacrifices quality with less 
use of the resources to achieve the goals (Baskerville 2004).  
This paper contributes on analyzing the impact of the main human factors, security 
cost and investment on information security in an agile environment. These factors 
have been identified in previous studies (Alavi et al. 2013) (Alavi et al. 2014) (Alavi 
et al. 2015). In particular, the paper proposes a language using a set of concepts to 
analyze the impact caused on the effectiveness of information security in an agile 
environment. This paper has adopted the Secure-Tropos methodology to identify and 
analyze agile information security concepts and extend it with the critical human 
factors and Security Investment (SI) so that appropriate justification can be taken 
into consideration in assuring reliability and effectiveness of Information Security 
Systems (ISS) in an agile environment (Mouratidis and Giorgini 2009).  
2. Related Works 
There have been a number of works that focus on analyzing agile methods and 
approaches in information security. This section includes the works that are relevant 
to the study’s approach. 
2.1. Agile Development Background 
Agile approach is a substitute to customary project management and 
characteristically used in software design development. It assists organizations for 
responding to unpredictability through additional and constant work intonations, 
where requirements and resolutions develop through collaboration between self-
organizing and cross-functional panels (Dybå et al. 2014). However, in case of 
running both traditional and agile projects at the same time, it is appropriate to 
having a balance in them (Serrador and Pinto 2015). Whilst factors such as project 
size and requirements are important in upfront planning in traditional methods, the 
importance of critical human factors and investment must be considered in agile 
projects as a security point of view. But lack of balance between two main methods 
can end up in waste of resources (Boehm 1996). The waste of resources put a 
limitation on organizations to address risks resulted from emerging threats. Some 
authors considered main discussed human factors in agile projects. Chagas, et al, 
used a systematic literature review in studies that carried out on human factors in 
agile projects (Chagas et al. 2015). They concluded that Communication, 
Collaboration and Trust are the most important in the literatures, as they are 
significant to the core of Agile projects (Chagas et al. 2015). In this paper we would 
argue that the critical human factors which we have concluded previously; 
communication, awareness and the support of management are as important as trust 
and collaborations in regards to the security in agile projects. We also argue that the 
role of security investment is as crucial as other factors in the agile process.  
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2.2. Characteristics of Agile Projects 
As agile projects are kicked off, responding to new security threats enter to a new 
environment where traditional planning and security approaches do not seem capable 
to deal with new requirements (Dove 2011). However, whilst agile projects bring 
some benefits to organizations, such as more frequent and dynamic product features, 
but there are some downsides, such as impact on security (Dove 2011). To 
understand the impacts on security in agile projects, the characteristics of such 
projects and impacts are reviewed. The main features of agile projects and security 
impacts are:  
▪ Proactive and innovative team members  
▪ Adapting and evolving through constant and dynamic changes  
▪ Responding to changes in a situation-driven not planning approach 
▪ Accelerated process using alternative direction 
▪ Very little but ongoing planning   
▪ Inconsistent and contradictory stakeholder goals 
▪ Financial uncertainty in regards to ROISI and cost-benefit analysis  
 
Furthermore, the security impacts of agile features can be summarized based on 
some of the main information security concepts. They are: 
 
Vulnerabilities: The weakness in the design, implementation, operation or internal 
controls in an agile process that could be exploited to violate security of the system 
which require to be identified and analyzed, using vulnerability assessment.  
Threats: The possible hazard to exploit the vulnerability which result to risk. Agile 
projects are potential threats to organizations which require an adequate risk analysis 
to be identify them and related vulnerabilities. Threat profiling is one of the essential 
steps to define them.  
Risk: The combination of the probability of an event and its consequence. 
Investment: Used by ROISI to established the monetary value of the losses.  
Goal: Both organizational and security goals must be considered to evaluate how 
investment helped to achieve goals.   
3. Main Factors in Agile Security Context 
3.1. Role of Human Factors in Agile Projects 
Dynamic software projects created new security requirements and whilst a big part of 
an agile software project includes the team-work between developers and people in 
an organization, critical human factors left untreated (Lin 2015). Whilst people do 
not have any specific motivation for agile development but they will support such 
method for making their job simpler. Three critical human factors in information 
security noted as: communication, security awareness and management support [1]. 
Other authors concluded quite similar factors as knowledge and leadership (Chagas 
et al. 2015). The nature and principle of agile projects create an urgency of 
consideration of human factors and socio-technical forces in which the technical 
matters become less important. This can be explained with ad-hoc and lack of 
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planned approach to such projects where non-technical forces become more powerful 
than traditional and planned software projects. Therefore, traditional and formal 
modelling requirements for software projects cannot be sought. Such outcome will 
have consequences on security matters. The problem, therefore, would be constant 
changes to meet agile requirements which have impacts on security system and 
policy. This creates challenges for the key elements of information security risk 
management where risk assessments, implementation of controls and security 
management metrics collide with changes in organizational agile requirements. Such 
challenges are met with critical human factors which are extremely difficult to be 
quantified and therefore, create a high security risk for organizations if they are left 
untreated. The difference between traditional software development projects and 
agile projects are mainly focused in planning where in the traditional plan-based 
methodologies human factors are not key consideration. However, in agile 
methodologies human factors are introduced in to the software development process 
in which the communication, awareness and senior management support and 
involvement are highlighted (Lin 2015). The absence of effective quantitative 
methods for analyzing the importance and impact of critical human factors left 
organization to rely extensively on project managers and project teams (Lin 2015). 
Such absence and challenges create an inadequate risk and vulnerability analysis 
which build information security ineffectiveness. In this paper we intend to highlight 
such critical factors and present a solution for greater consideration of critical factors 
and security investment.  
3.2. Cost and Investment in Agile Projects 
It is already well known that an investment and return on investment are important 
matters for enterprises. Software development and information security projects are 
both influenced greatly with economic factors where the cost benefit analysis plays 
an important role in it. Application software development and enterprise analysis use 
the advantage of agile methods to advance process quality and rise the opportunities 
to deliver a project in time, within budget, whilst they produce a high quality product 
(Dove 2011). The success in achievement of project objectives within a specified 
budget is considered to be an important principle. Budgets, investment and 
associated costs are therefore crucial factors. Such variables are easy to quantify and 
can be simply assumed by senior management team as they can be presented in 
numbers with a monetary value. Therefore, a quantification of return on security 
investment assists in the process of cost benefit analysis in agile process where there 
is no formal and advance planning in place. The use of Risk-Driven Security 
Investment Model (RIDIM) enables organizations to quantify the return on the 
security investment in regards to security incidents (Alavi et al. 2015). This model 
will help the organizations to achieve a quantifiable measurement for security 
incidents that help them to consider it when they run their agile software projects. 
The main factors which influence the cost and investment in agile projects can be 
summarized in a number of issues (Wu and Bailey 2007). Firstly, agile lifecycle 
projects unlike traditional development process, facilitates the investment to be used 
resourcefully throughout the lifecycle of the process. The agility process is to able to 
adjust the use of investment in order to maximize the return on the investment. 
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Secondly, agile development process enables organizations with significantly less 
time and transaction cost. This is in contrast with traditional techniques in which 
process requires a long time and costly exercise. The third factor is concerning the 
risk control and mitigation. Agile process carries more risks than traditional methods 
because constant repetitions and hasty process contains more risk which ironically 
benefited organization more. This is because organizations will be able to mitigate 
those risks that are based on the early completion and therefore, controls are more 
justified.    
3.3. Threats in Agile Projects 
Threat is described as an event with an unwanted effect on a security system where 
threats are the root causes of impacts and risk are the effects (Baskerville 2004) 
(Brotby 2009). Potential threats in agile projects can contribute to the integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of data system by exploiting vulnerabilities in an 
established IT infrastructure. Threats are potentially hampering the goals and 
creating risks and restraining investment as return on the security investment point of 
view. Threats in traditional projects can be defined and understood differently from 
agile projects for the differences which we described for both approaches. Whilst 
agile methods providing a platform for responding quickly to emerging threats, they 
can create new types of threats too. It is therefore important the identification of 
threats and opportunities within an agile project in order to balance the desire for 
reward against the risk incurred in its pursuit as the security point of view. This 
requires thorough understanding of risk appetite and tolerance within an agile 
project.  
4. Framing Concepts 
The process of securing information assets in agile environment has developed 
greatly during the last decade. Sometimes information security is seen as it is in odds 
with agility. It is vital for organizations to find a balance between security and 
agility. This includes the change of risk evaluation and prioritization, return on 
security investment as well as change of trend of human factors that should be in line 
with organizational objectives. It is also important to define clearly and separately 
the risk concept and security threats with an understanding of the threats concept 
from a risk perspective.   
4.1. Concepts  
In order to understand risk-investment dependencies in the agile security 
environment, it is necessary to understand the relationships among the relevant 
concepts such as actors, goal, risk, security investment, threats and security agile in 
the organizational environment. Specifically, an understanding of the impacts and 
dependencies between the actors and security agile characteristics are required to 
address information security requirements and objectives. To achieve this, the paper 
used some features from Secure Tropos-modelling language, based on risk analysis, 
actor, goals, security investment and agile security. The Meta-model characterizes 
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the primary conceptual components and consistent relationships amongst the 
attributes related to information security agile changes. Therefore, the Meta-model 
forms an abstraction view of the features. Figure 1 illustrates the Meta-model of the 
proposed risk-investment approach incorporating actor, goal, security investment, 
risk, controls and agile security.  
Actor: is an active concept that purposefully performs crucial activities to achieve 
critical goals. It characterizes an entity that has intentional objectives within a system 
and organizational context for achieving goals whilst set of requirements to be 
satisfied, such as completing tasks, within dependencies between actors. 
Stakeholders (customers and employees), project team, information security system 
and management are the actors. Management team initiated the agile software 
development project. The project’s documentation, elicitation, analysis and 
verification will be done by the project team which will be using by the stakeholders 
after management team in the organization approve it. Whilst, organization and 
management team have concerns over business-management practices and cost, the 
security is the concern of the information security system. Therefore, each actor 
follows their own strategic goals. This creates a quite difficult environment where 
the relationship between actors are constrained and hard to manage. At initial stage 
the identification of all actors are important as the agile development concerns all, 
which includes security too. It is also the impact on the actors which effects the agile 
project itself. For example, modifications in security requirements will have impacts 
on other actors in the organizational context. Therefore, time should be given for 
actors to receive adequate training and awareness education. It is also important for 
senior management team to promote the culture of security awareness and trust in 
their teams. Actors require to stay focus and team to reflect on their method of 
functioning and constantly improve themselves. This helps when security is 
breached, then actors can instantly and adequately take action to address the issue 
and avert additional damage to assets. People from different disciplines should act 
collectively to form a shared understanding and come up with methods to address the 
issue, solve it, and help the security team to put the updated control into process. 
Actors require to be involved fully to be able to act quickly and effectively. 
Goal: is the actors’ desire for the development of a project and its environment 
which provides an understanding of the needs and support the clients in an agile 
project. Identifying goals would help to know what to form before the project 
development begins so as to avert expensive and costly amendment. However, the 
process of goal fulfilment must be attained with an agreement of all actors. This also 
applies in agile projects in which all actors should have an agreement of shared 
planned. However, the important issue in agile projects in regards to goal is that such 
projects focus on characters and functionality requested by the stakeholders and 
actors over information system and organizational context. In case of any changes in 
the organizational context the agile security goals stay same. Goal concept has two 
categories, the security goal and organizational goal. These goals should be set up in 
the early phase of agile projects to ensure security is considered fully. The clarity in 
setting goals enables organizations to prevent future complexity in an agile 
environment.   
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Risk: In the context of this paper, risk is a likely harm to information assets in an 
organization, as consequence of an uncertainty of security arrangements in an agile 
project. Risk to information assets ought to be defined and managed, considering risk 
is an event that can be determined (Sillaber and Breu 2015). In a traditional approach 
defining and quantifying its impact is somewhat straightforward which is a function 
of threats as they try to exploit vulnerabilities, and in light of the controls, 
information assets can be protected. There are various ways to measure this such as:   
 
Risk= (           ) x (Asset Value)  
As it is clearly shows in this formula the clarification of tangible values used for 
somewhat intangible assets. One the main concern for a better risk management 
should be a consideration of the likelihood of an identified risk and the impact of the 
risk. Considering definition of risk in relation to threats which exploit vulnerabilities 
and the value of the information assets, the exposure section must be clearly defined 
in information security policy. This also concerns investment and the return of it. 
Such factors are pressing and challenging issues in agile security. Since agile 
development promises the flexibility and speed in a dynamic environment, creates 
some uncertainties in maintain adequate and effective security strategy. The most 
uncertainties come from human factors and training people in regards to deal with 
ad-hoc security matters when they arise. Investment also an important matter which 
may create uncertainties as agile project are developed in a very short of time in 
which they financial impact assessment may have not been considered in details and 
correctly. However, organizations can provide a better security resilience with the 
consideration of return on security investment, security in each alteration, proactive 
maintenance of security, team-working and adequate response to security incidents. 
One of the mechanism to reduce risks and minimize their impacts is automation. The 
use of automation and business applications assists some of the time-consuming, 
tedious and error-prone activities to be carried out more effectively. Use of 
automating can considerably improve accuracy, reduce risk whilst at the same time 
to help for minimizing the time, quite significantly, for processing the changes. It is 
important to mention that agile is not a single entity in organizations but includes 
multiple areas of organizational activities. Therefore, there are various dimension are 
involved as information security point of view in which risk is one of the core 
aspects of such considerations. Identification and prioritization of risks therefore are 
important to deliver security as it required.    
Vulnerabilities: are any types of weakness in an organization’s information system, 
including software, hardware and internal controls, which leave information security 
expose to threats. Information security systems can use a risk-based approach to 
address and manage the vulnerabilities, considering they know where they are. 
Whilst vulnerabilities are located then they can be expressed in detailed and 
quantifiable rapports. There are certain elements in a vulnerability assessment that 
should be considered, such as resource identification and importance, as well as 
threat and control measure clarifications. Having a less well-defined threat analysis 
Threats Vulnerabilities x 
Controls 
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which some organizations consider brings little attention than a vulnerability 
assessment that attempt an itemized list of weaknesses to address. It requires a 
combination of a threat source with a vulnerability to score in an asset exploit. 
Therefore, an arrangement of both sets of information must be contemplated. The 
vulnerability assessments are the combination of a performed, technical, 
administrative, physical processes and controls. However, it is more preferable that 
such assessments are being evaluated in the context of the threat assessments. A 
coherent, definitive and corrective action of prioritization and proper scheduling can 
be assumed if the vulnerabilities and threats to be considered jointly.  
Investment: In the context of this paper, investment is the budget that is being 
allocated for security controls for supporting organizational and security goals and 
better deployment, integration, and customization of various security controls. Such 
controls assist organization to mitigate information security risks. Whilst security 
investment is seen essential for risk mitigation, the approach, strategy and levels of 
investment are disputed (Pandey and Snekkenes 2013). Despite the various 
approaches and analysis, organizations require to link the security investment 
requirements to the main organizational objectives. On-off investment in information 
security would not be able to deal with agile requirements as they happen to have 
fast and dynamic natures. Therefore, security investment should be considered 
fragmentally and on ad-hoc and situation-driven basis.   
Controls: are protecting organizations’ information assets by the means of 
prevention and/or detection. Well-executed information security controls provide a 
prime opportunity for organizations in regards to their conformity and performance. 
This can be used as a competitive advantage in the market for such organization. 
Strong approach by organizations to information security controls can leverage their 
competitive differentiators to boost market share, reputation, and profitability. In an 
agile environment the way controls are set up is important. Dynamic agile 
requirements, demands a dynamic security controls. In agile project a constant and 
situation-driven controls are required in order for security matter arisen on different 
and ever-changing environment.   
Return on Information Security Investment (ROISI): Information security 
systems and security strategies are essential to day-to-day operation in organizations. 
However, they ought to be cost effective. But information security professionals 
struggle to demonstrate the cost effectiveness and ROISI in a language that senior 
executives to understand. Each asset in an information system has a value and its 
own monetary value in organizations. Therefore, each threat and vulnerability 
associated with one or more than one asset has financial impacts on organizations. 
One of the purpose of pursuing agile project is to minimize cost (Serrador and Pinto 
2015). Despite this goal agile security hamper both organizational and security goals 
and put a lot of stress on the security investment.  
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Figure 1: Meta-Model: Risk-Investment Agile Security  
Figure 1 presents the Meta-Model, which is the combination of the above concepts, 
linked with some of the Secure Tropos security concepts to show risk-investment 
concepts in agile security projects. An actor has goals within an organization context 
which is also involving within the change of business context and these goals 
influenced the investment and controls. Therefore, both investment and controls need 
to align with the change of agile security landscape as the substance and value of 
information assets can be varies as the project requirements change. Risk assessment 
is also influenced by the agile context, for instance the value of perceive and residual 
security risks can change any time based on the severity of potential threats. In 
addition, the scope and threat profiling and vulnerability assessments within the risk 
assessment process will be influenced by agile context. This stimulates the visibility 
of risk, ensuring collective possession and accountability in relation to risk, and 
supporting well-informed decision making in an organizational context in respect to 
both organizational and security goals.  
4.2. Process  
Organizations and firms demand that information systems and consequently 
information security systems to adjust themselves to the ever changing and dynamic 
business environment. Thus agile projects introduce to respond to such demands. 
Despite surge of agile projects, there are many critical arguments that oppose them. 
Table 1 shows characteristic differences between traditional and agile approaches.  
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Traditional Approach Agile Approach 
technological-centric human-centric  
process-centric  collaborative decision-making  
continual control and refining the process iterative development cycles  
Fully documentation of process minimal documentation  
Table 1: Characterization of Traditional and Agile Approach 
There are several agile development methods. However, the most relevant to this 
paper and information security field is, the Feature Driven Development (FDD) 
development technique. FDD is a client, people and architecture-centric software 
method which delivers a robust modelling techniques (Box 2008). It emphases on the 
lifecycle phases of design and features are the main aspect of it. FDD used by many 
security and information assurance solutions. It contains some main activities that 
includes, developing high-level object model, building a feature list, grouping 
features into related subject areas, to plan by feature and identification of class 
owners and feature set owners. FDD has a number of security limitations and issues 
such as privileges and associated risks and security investment (Firdaus et al. 2014). 
For such limitations and problems some authors introduced the Secure Feature 
Driven Development (SFDD) (Firdaus et al. 2014). The concepts which this paper 
provided with the consideration of critical human factors and security investment on 
the basis of a risk-based solution can be fitted into SFDD methodology. SFDD 
introduced two additional phases known as Build Security and Test Security by 
features (Firdaus et al. 2014). The risk-based approach by this paper can be fitted to 
these new phases in the SFDD model at both stages. 
5. Discussion 
This paper offers a risks-investment based language considering human factors and 
security investment in agile security. It forms from some concepts such as goal, 
actor, investment, vulnerability, risk, and control that allow the analysis of agile 
security and recommendations for adequate control to ensure security is served in an 
agile environment. The control phase which includes attributes such as physical, 
technical and administrative, must be based on three pillars, transparency, inspection 
and adaptation that noted by Scrum technique (Fitzer 2015). These three pillars are 
important as security and its adequate architecture in an agile project always 
discussed up at top layers of organizations. The high-level solutions to security in 
agile environment remain relatively constant, even when there are local disparities in 
how the solutions are achieved. Flexibility and creativity guarantee security 
objectives are met in the appearance of change. This is particularly correct in an agile 
environment where critical human factors, risk and security investment play an 
intertwined role. The key to successful implementation of new controls is with 
ongoing involvement and profound engagement by people whilst human factors are 
considered and risks are defined adequately. Right allocation of investment for new 
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control and help stakeholders and actors to understand the reasoning behind security 
requirements assists security to achieve its objectives in an agile environment. One 
of important part of the discussion about security in agile environments, would be 
enterprise risk management which directly affect security arrangements, 
requirements and architecture. Enterprise risk management (ERM) consider risk 
from both internal and external perspectives and sources. These risks, mainly 
accompanying with swift and unanticipated changes which can be handled in a better 
manner when organizations are able to address human factors and security 
investment adequately.   
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we discussed a novel approach to deal with security in an agile 
environment. There is a constant claim that security makes it harder for organizations 
to be agile and more responsive. This is referred and related to the security standards, 
process, governance and more importantly security architect and controls. With the 
proposed language in this paper, organizations can be agile and at the same time to 
have their own security controls and policies. Having a solid security foundation 
which enforced by adequate investment and consideration of critical human factors, 
effective vulnerability assessment and adequate risk identification process, 
organizations can form a well-built security architecture. This process should be 
continually reviewed and revised. The security matters should be discussed 
holistically at board level with consistent risk identification, considering human 
factors which allows right investment to be made available for security controls.     
 
7. Limitations and Future Studies 
This paper has its own limitations. Firstly, we have not used any case study to 
acquire language applicability. The future study should consider a case study to find 
out whether the approach can be applied to real scenario. This is quite important 
matter, as security related subjects always behave with discrepancies when they used 
in real world case studies. The concepts used in this language requires more clarity in 
regards to detailed reactions of each concept when they put in an agile environment 
framework. This would be another limitation which future study should consider to 
ensure the maturity of the approach. The solution this paper provides can be 
considered for future studies considering SFDD model 
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